Frictional Assignment, Part II: Infinite Horizon and Inequality by Shouyong Shi
Frictional Assignment, Part II:









In this paper I study the assignment between machines of heterogeneous qualities and
workers of heterogeneous skills in an inﬁnite-horizon economy with matching frictions. I
characterize ﬁrst the eﬃcient assignment and then the decentralizing market equilibrium. The
eﬃcient allocation assigns a unique machine quality and market tightness to each skill. This
eﬃcient allocation is saddle-path stable and the assignment along the stable path is constant
over time. The eﬃcient assignment is not positively assortative when machine qualities and
skills are not suﬃciently complementary with each other. Moreover, eﬃcient wage rates are
increasing functions of the skill level when the assignment is positively assortative, but not
always so when the assignment is not positively assortative. Nevertheless, the social value of
workers always increases in the skill level.
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In many markets each side contains heterogeneous agents and it is time consuming to match
the two sides to produce “output”. This two-sided matching problem, which I call a “frictional
assignment”, has attracted attention recently.1 Part of the reason is that frictional assignments
diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the frictionless counterparts which Becker (1973) and Tinbergen (1951)
examined in their seminal works. In particular, a frictional assignment can fail to be positively
assortative (or positive for short). That is, an equilibrium with matching frictions may not neces-
sarily assign the agents of high attributes to each other, even if the attributes are complementary
in production. In this paper I characterize the eﬃcient assignment with matching frictions and
the corresponding decentralizing mechanism.
Previous papers on frictional assignments (see footnote 1) analyze only equilibrium allocations,
which are generically ineﬃcient. The reason is that those papers model search as an undirected
process, by assuming an exogenous matching function that determines each agent’s matching
probability and an exogenous rule that splits the match surplus between agents ex post (after
match). With undirected search, agents do not take into account the inﬂuence of their actions on
their matching rates. So, the equilibrium fails to internalize matching externalities. Moreover,
previous papers often examine a static environment, represented by either a one-period setup or
a steady state, which leaves the dynamic features of the assignment unexplored.
In a precursor to the current paper (Shi 2001), I characterized the eﬃcient assignment between
machine qualities and workers’ skills in a one-period economy with matching frictions. The main
r e s u l t sw e r et h a tt h es o c i a l l ye ﬃcient assignment may be non-positively assortative (non-positive
for short) and that there exists a market mechanism to decentralize the eﬃcient allocation. In
the current paper I extend the analysis to an inﬁnite-horizon economy.
An inﬁnite horizon is necessary for addressing the following issues. First, it is not clear whether
the eﬃcient assignment can still be non-positive. In a one-period frictional economy, a non-
positive assignment may be eﬃcient because it can increase the matching success (or utilization)
of skilled workers and high-quality machines. In an inﬁnite horizon, however, the weight that
eﬃciency puts on utilization is much smaller, because unmatched agents can continue to seek a
match in the future. Second, intertemporal eﬃciency and dynamic stability are important issues
in an inﬁnite-horizon economy, because current and future matches are interdependent on each
other. Expectations about the value of future matches aﬀect the current assignment and, in
turn, the current assignment aﬀects the social value of future matches by changing the number
of workers available for future matches. An eﬃc i e n ta s s i g n m e n tm u s tb ee ﬃcient along the entire
dynamic path, rather than being so in only the steady state or one particular period. Because
of the intertemporal link, it is not even clear whether the eﬃcient assignment is dynamically
1See Burdett and Coles (1997), Sattinger (1995), and Shimer and Smith (2000).
1stable or able to reach a steady state. Third, it is more challenging to characterize the market
mechanism that decentralizes the eﬃcient allocation along the entire time path.
To address these issues, I describe the eﬃcient assignment as the decision problem of a ﬁctional
social planner, who maximizes the discounted sum of match surpluses. The planner faces the same
matching frictions as the market does, namely, that it takes time to match the two sides and that
there is no coordination between the matches. In particular, the social planner is not able to
assign each individual machine to match with each individual worker, although he can assign a
group of machines of the same quality to match with a group of workers of the same skill. This
coordination failure implies that there are unmatched workers (and machines) in each period. To
maximize the sum of social surpluses, the planner chooses the machine quality and the number
of machines to match with each group of workers of the same skill. The matching function is
endogenous.
I reformulate the social planner’s problem recursively, where the eﬃcient choices in each
period are related to the next period only by the social value of future matches. This allows
me to express the eﬃcient choices in each period as functions of two variables — the number of
unmatched workers at the beginning of the current period and the future value of workers. The
dynamic system of these two variables characterizes the dynamics of the eﬃcient allocation.
The dynamic system is saddle-path stable under rational expectations (perfect foresight).
Moreover, the eﬃcient assignment and the social value of workers are constant over time along
the stable path. This stability result enables me to adapt the central results in Shi (2001) to
an inﬁnite-horizon economy. In particular, the eﬃcient assignment is one-to-one between skills
and machine qualities; the assignment is non-positive if skills and machine qualities are not
suﬃciently complementary with each other; and the market tightness varies systematically with
the assignment. I then show that a market mechanism can decentralize the entire time path of
the eﬃcient assignment. A critical feature of the decentralizing mechanism is that ﬁrms post
wages and machine qualities to direct the intended workers’ search.
Dynamic stability is a result of the eﬃcient trade-oﬀ between current and future matches. To
understand this, it is useful to imagine that the economy is oﬀ t h es t a b l ep a t hi nt h es e n s et h a t
the social value of workers in the current period exceeds the steady state. In this case it is costly
to delay a match to next period, because the delay foregoes the gain from a current match and
suﬀers from discounting. For the eﬃcient allocation to leave some workers for future matches,
the future value of workers must exceed the steady state by suﬃciently more than the current
value of workers does. In fact, to compensate for the foregone gain from a current match, the
gap between the social value of workers and its steady state must grow over time at a rate higher
than the discounting rate. This violates the transversality condition required for intertemporal
eﬃciency. Similarly, an assignment is not intertemporally eﬃcient if the social value of workers
2in the current period falls below the steady state.2
The general contribution of this paper is the characterizations of the eﬃcient assignment and
the decentralizing mechanism in an economy with matching frictions. The speciﬁc contributions
relative to the one-period setup in Shi (2001) are as follows. First, this paper provides a way
to extend the intuitions and results to the inﬁnite-horizon economy. Although the eﬃcient as-
signment in this paper turns out to have similar properties to those in the one-period setup,
the similarity is far from being obvious ex ante, given the restrictive nature of the one-period
setup. Moreover, the similarity is deceiving, because the extension of the results relies heavily
on saddle-path stability which is irrelevant in a static environment. As Shimer (2001b) testiﬁes,
saddle-path stability should not be presumed. Second, this paper yields strong predictions on the
time patterns of the eﬃcient assignment. The machine quality and market tightness assigned to
each skill must be constant over time. So must be the wage for each skill in the market mech-
anism that decentralizes the eﬃcient allocation. These predictions are useful for discussing how
the assignment, wages, and inequality respond to shocks dynamically (see section 6).
The decentralizing mechanism in this paper features directed search, as each ﬁrm announces
(and commits to) the wage path and the machine quality to attract the workers of a speciﬁc
skill level. Thus, the paper belongs to the burgeoning literature originated in Peters (1991) and
Montgomery (1991).3 In contrast to the current paper, however, other papers on directed search
often assume that one or two sides of the market are homogeneous, thus missing the gist of
the assignment problem. Notable exceptions are Peters and Siow (2002), Shi (forthcoming) and
Shimer (2001a). However, these papers study one-period economies, which cannot address the
dynamic issues raised in this paper.
There are other diﬀerences. Peters and Siow (2002) analyze the marriage market in which
premarital investments serve as a device to direct the search of potential marriage partners. In
contrast to the possibility of non-positive assignments here, they show that the eﬃcient equilib-
rium has positively assortative matching according to premarital investment levels. Their result
arises from the assumption that arbitrarily ﬁne distinctions between the premarital investment
levels can be publicly observed and rewarded by the market according to a non-stochastic re-
turn function. This assumption eﬀectively eliminates the coordination failure among an agent’s
potential partners. In contrast, I assume realistically that the description of types (skills) is im-
precise and so each skill level consists of a large number of workers. Thus, there is coordination
2The one-to-one nature of the eﬃc i e n ta s s i g n m e n ti sa l s oi m p o r t a n tf o rs addle-path stability. A case for com-
parison is Shimer (2001b). By assuming an exogenous matching function, Shimer precludes the ability of the social
planner to target only one skill to a particular machine quality. As a result, mixed matching occurs. Moreover, the
threshold skill level that is acceptable for a match with a particular machine quality depends on expectations of the
value of future matches. This dependence creates perpetual cycles in the eﬃcient assignment. Such dependence
does not exist with the one-to-one assignment.
3See Moen (1997), Burdett et al. (2001), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Cao and Shi (2000), and Julien et al.
(2000).
3failure among the workers of the same skill, which makes utilization an important consideration
for eﬃciency and allows a non-positive assignment to be eﬃcient in some cases.
Shi (forthcoming) and Shimer (2001a) show that the eﬃcient assignment can be mixed in a
one-period setup. Such mixing arises because the assignment is allowed to be lexicographic. In
particular, the social planner can assign both skills s1 and s2 t om a t c hw i t ham a c h i n e( s a y ,o f
quality k) but select a skill s2 workers for the match only when no skill s1 worker shows up at
the match. Mixing occurs when some quality k machines receive skill s1 workers while others
do not. In the current paper, I allow multiple-skill assignments to give probabilistic selection
priorities, but not lexicographic ones, to the targeted skills. I will show in section 5 that this
restriction implies that the eﬃcient assignment must be one-to-one. I will also explain the reasons
for excluding lexicographic selection rules.
Before describing the model, it is useful to mention that in this paper the distribution of
machines is determined endogenously by free entry while the distribution of skills is ﬁxed. In
a standard assignment problem, the distributions on both sides of the market are ﬁxed. The
non-standard element in this paper simpliﬁes the analysis and is important for the decentralizing
mechanism, but it is not the reason why the eﬃcient assignment can be non-positive. To the
contrary, free entry of machines may even increase the chance for the eﬃcient assignment to be
positive, as the social planner can choose the distribution of machine qualities to alleviate the
matching diﬃculty that high-skill workers face. In this sense, allowing for free entry on one side
of the market makes it more striking that the eﬃcient assignment can be non-positive.
2. An Economy with Matching Frictions
Consider an economy where all agents are risk neutral, live forever and have a discount factor
β ∈ (0,1). Workers diﬀer in skills and, to make things simple, skills are observable and measurable
by a one-dimensional object s (e.g., education attainment), which lies in a set S of discrete points
with a minimum sL > 0a n dam a x i m u msH. There are a large, exogenous number of workers of
each skill s, n(s). Machines diﬀer in qualities, denoted k ∈ R+, and the distribution of machines
is endogenously determined through ﬁrms’ entry. At the end of the period, a machine vanishes
with probability ρ ∈ (0,1), which can be interpreted as the depreciation rate. A quality k machine
costs C(k)/[1 − β(1 − ρ)] to make.
A worker can operate only one machine at a time. A skill s worker and a quality k machine
together produce output F(k,s). Utility is transferrable between ﬁrms and workers.4 The pair
(k,s) generates a surplus F(k,s) − C(k)p e rp e r i o d .
Assumption 1. (Regularity) (i) C(0) ≥ 0, Ck(0) = 0, Ck(k) > 0 and Ckk(k) ≥ 0 for all k>0;
(ii) Fk(k,s) > 0, Fkk(k,s) < 0, Fs(k,s) > 0 and Fss(k,s) < 0 for all s and k;
4For a random matching environment with non-transferrable utility, see Burdett and Wright (1998).
4(iii) Fks > 0, F(0,s)=F(k,0) = 0;
(iv) There exists a non-empty subset K ⊂ R+ such that F(k,sL) − C(k) > 0 for all k ∈ K.
Conditions (i) and (ii) are standard. Condition (iii) requires skills and machine qualities to
be complementary with each other and, for unmatched machines and workers, output to be zero.
Condition (iv) says that even the lowest skill can produce positive net output with some machine
qualities. Since Fs > 0, there are machines that produce positive net output for all skill levels.
As in the search labor literature (e.g., Diamond 1982, Mortensen 1982, and Pissarides 1990), I
adopt the following standard assumptions: (a) There is no coordination among workers or ﬁrms;
( b )I ne a c hp e r i o daw o r k e rc a nh a v eam a t c hw i t ho n l yal i m i t e dn u m b e ro fﬁrms, which I
normalize to one, and mixed strategies are permitted; (c) Before making a machine available for
matching, a ﬁrm must incur a vacancy cost, which I set to be the rental cost of the machine in
the period; and (d) Only unemployed workers and vacant machines participate in the matching
process.5 The assumptions (a) and (b) are important, because they imply matching frictions.
Matched workers produce immediately. Then, some pairs separate and join the matching
pool next period. Each match with a skill s worker separates with an exogenous probability
σ(s) ∈ (0,1), with a realistic restriction σ0(s) ≤ 0.6 Part of the reason for separation is that the
machine vanishes, and so σ has already included the depreciation probability ρ.
The matching rates depend on the assignment between machines and workers. In principle,
each machine can be assigned to match with multiple skills, with only one worker being chosen
after the match. For such multiple-skill assignments, I exclude lexicographic selection rules by
the following assumption.
Assumption 2. (Not-lexicographic) Take any k ∈ K. Suppose that a machine of quality k
is assigned to match with skills in a set (si)i∈I,w h e r eI is an index set and si ∈ S for each i.L e t
Ri be the number of si workers received by the machine and xi the probability that the job is
given to skill si.A s s u m exi > 0 for all i ∈ I such that Ri > 0.
This is a weak assumption, in the sense that it still permits the assignment to rank proba-
bilistically the skills targeted to each machine. For example, if the assignment targets both skills
s1 and s2 to a machine, it can give skill s1 a higher selection probability than skill s2.W h a t
the assumption does exclude in this case is that the assignment gives the job to skill s1 with
probability one even when both skills show up.
5If matched ﬁrms and workers could search, their incentives and options would be diﬀerent from those who
are unmatched. The resulting equilibrium would have a distribution of machine assignments and a distribution of
wages for each skill.
6I assume that production immediately follows matching in the same period, rather than the typical assumption
that new matches begin to produce in the next period. This diﬀerence in assumptions is inconsequential, but the
current assumption makes it easy to interpret the results in the special case β → 0o rσ → 1 as the ones in a static
model.
5Under Assumption Not-lexicographic, I will show in section 5 that there is no mixed matching
at the level of individual machines; i.e., the eﬃcient allocation assigns each machine to only one
skill level. However, this does not preclude mixed matching at the aggregate level a priori.
Machines of the same quality may be divided into diﬀerent subgroups, with each subgroup being
assigned to match with a distinct skill. Whether such aggregate mixing is socially eﬃcient or
consistent with an equilibrium is an issue that will be examined in this paper.
Because each machine is assigned to only one skill level, let me pick a particular skill level
s ∈ S and describe the machines assigned to the workers of such skill in a period. Let φ(s)d e n o t e
the set of machine qualities that are assigned to match with skill s workers and φ−1(k)t h es e to f
skill levels that are assigned to match with quality k machines. For each k ∈ φ(s), let M(k,s)b e
the number of quality k machines and M(k,s)B(k,s)( ≤ n(s)) the number of unemployed skill
s workers assigned to match with each other. Call this subgroup of machines and unemployed
workers the unit (k,s). The number B is the tightness of workers in the unit, where a higher B
means higher congestion of workers. The matching rates in the unit are as follows:
for each machine: 1 − e−B(k,s)





These matching rates will be derived later from the decentralized economy in section 4. The
planner is constrained by these matching rates.
An assignment in period t is a set of machine qualities φt(s)f o re a c hs ∈ S and the two
numbers (Mt(kt,s),B t(kt,s)) for each kt ∈ φt(s). The numbers M and B are a necessary part
of an assignment, in addition to φ, because they determine the number of matches which is
important for social welfare. However, I will often follow the convention to refer to φ as the
assignment. The assignment is one-to-one if both φ and φ−1 are single-valued. Otherwise, the
assignment is mixed at the aggregate level. The assignment is positive if φ is monotone.
Before characterizing the eﬃcient assignment in the frictional environment, let me characterize
the assignment without the matching friction. In such a frictionless world, all workers are matched
instantaneously. The planner picks machine qualities φp(s)f o rs k i l ls workers to maximize the
social surplus for each pair. That is, for each s ∈ S,t h efrictionless assignment φp(s) is such that
Fk(kp(s),s)=Ck(kp(s)) for all kp(s) ∈ φp(s). (2.1)
Under Assumption Regularity, φp(s) is a singleton. It is also positive and time-invariant. With
free entry of ﬁrms, the competitive equilibrium that decentralizes this frictionless assignment
exhausts all proﬁts. So, the frictionless wage rate of skill s workers is
wp(s)=F(φp(s),s) − C(φp(s)). (2.2)
63. Eﬃcient Assignment with Frictions
3.1. Formulation and deﬁnition
Constrained by matching frictions, the social planner chooses (φ,M,B) to maximize the dis-
counted sum of match surpluses. The calculation of these surpluses is complicated, due to the
irreversibility of machine costs. The following conjecture simpliﬁes the calculation and it will be
veriﬁed later in Proposition Stable:
Conjecture 3.1. For any k and any t ≥ 0,t h en u m b e ro fq u a l i t yk machines demanded in the
matching process in period t +1is greater than or equal to the number of such machines that
are vacant at the end of period t after separation and depreciation.
Under this conjecture, a machine will be used in every period since its creation, in either produc-
tion or the matching process, until it vanishes. Instead of counting the total cost of the machine
at the time of its creation, I can equivalently count the present value of the rents accrued to the
machine. The proper discount factor in calculating the present value of rents is β(1 − ρ).
Now consider a machine in the unit (kt,s). The vacancy cost in period t is C(kt). If the
machine is matched in the period, the ﬂow of net output is [F(kt,s) − C(kt)] in each future
period where the machine remains matched.7 The discount factor on future net output is a(s) ≡
β[1 − σ(s)], which takes future separation into account. The present value of net output created




=[ F(kt,s) − a(s)C(kt)]/[1 − a(s)].
(3.1)
Because each machine in the unit (kt,s) is matched with probability 1 − e−Bt(kt,s) and there are








The eﬃcient assignment maximizes the discounted sum of EV(kt,s), summing over skills, machine
qualities, and time.
The assignment in a period aﬀects the number of workers available for future matches. Let
ut(s)b et h en u m b e ro fs k i l ls workers who are unemployed at the beginning of t,a n dEt(s)t h e
number of skill s w o r k e r sw h oa r ee m p l o y e di np e r i o dt before separation takes place. Then,









7Notice that the machine quality kt does not change over time for the pair, since there is no re-assignment for
t h ep a i ra sl o n ga st h e ys t a ym a t c h e d .
7Eq. (3.3) is an accounting identity. Eq. (3.4) states that employment in period t consists of
employed workers in period t − 1 who did not separated and the workers newly recruited in














Clearly, the number of unemployed skill s workers allocated for matching across diﬀerent units
cannot exceed the available number ut(s), and so the following inequality must hold:
X
kt∈φt(s)
Mt(kt,s)Bt(kt,s) ≤ ut(s). (3.6)
Let λt(s)/[1 − σ(s)] be the multiplier of the constraint (3.5), measured in terms of period-t
utility. As it will become clear later, λ is the (discounted) future value of workers.F o rt h ee ﬃcient
allocation to have non-trivial solution, λ must satisfy the transversality condition, as stated in
the following deﬁnition.








EV(kt,s)( 3 . 7 )
for a given initial distribution {u0(s)}s∈S (i.e., for {E−1(s)}s∈S), subject to (3.5), (3.6), and the
following transversality condition:
lim
t→∞βtλt(s)=0 , for all s ∈ S. (3.8)
3.2. Recursive formulation and the solution
For an assignment to be eﬃcient, it must make the best trade-oﬀ between current and future
matches. To highlight this intertemporal trade-oﬀ, it is useful to reformulate the allocation
problem recursively. Pick an arbitrary period t and suppress the subscript t whenever possible.
Use the subscript +i to stand for t + i and −i for t − i.L e tL(u(s)) be the total social value of
skill s workers unemployed at the beginning of the period. Then,








 s.t. (3.5) and (3.6).
It is easy to verify that for each s ∈ S,t h es o l u t i o nt o( P0)i st h es a m ea st o( Po). Note that
λ(s)=a(s)L0(u+1(s)) (recall that a ≡ β(1 − σ)), and so λ(s) is indeed the social marginal value
of (unemployed) skill s workers in the next period.8 Refer to the multiplier of (3.6) in (P0)a st h e
social gain from matching a skill s worker today relative to tomorrow and denote it as Ω(s).
8The discounting takes into account the fact that separation in the current period increases the number of
unemployed workers in the future and hence deﬂates the social value of such workers.
8The recursive formulation indicates that the current assignment depends on future assignments
only through λ.G i v e nλ, I can decompose the inﬁnite horizon problem into a sequence of one-
period problems. In turn, the path of λ can be determined by requiring it to be consistent with
rational expectations (i.e., perfect foresight). For any given future value of workers, λ(s), the
assignment problem in a period is as follows:
(P00)m a x (k,B) e−B(k,s) [PV(k,s) − λ(s)]
subject to:








λ(s)+e−Bo(ko,s) [PV(ko,s) − λ(s)]
o
, (3.10)
then kI(s)=ko(s) ∈ φo(s) and BI = Bo.
Proof. I ﬁrst characterize the solution to (P0). Since ko ∈ φo(s), I have Mo(ko,s) > 0a n d
Bo(ko,s) > 0. Suppress the superscript o.N o t i n gt h a tλ(s)/[1 − σ(s)] is the multiplier of (3.5)
and Ω(s) of (3.6), I can obtain the following ﬁrst-order conditions of (P0)f o r( k,M,B)a n dt h e







[PV(k,s) − λ(s)] − C(k)=Ω(s)B(k,s), (3.12)
Ω(s)=e−B(k,s) [PV(k,s) − λ(s)], (3.13)
λ−1(s)=a(s)[λ(s)+Ω(s)]. (3.14)
In addition, the transversality condition (3.8) must be satisﬁed. Using (3.13) to eliminate Ω,
(3.12) becomes (3.9) and (3.14) becomes (3.10). That is, if the sequence of λ(s)o b e y s( 3 . 8 )a n d
(3.10), then (3.9) and (3.11) characterize the eﬃcient ko(s) ∈ φo(s)a n dBo(ko(s),s). To prove
the lemma, it suﬃces to show that the ﬁrst order condition of (P00)f o rk produces (3.11). This
is straightforward. QED
The problem (P00) in Lemma Decompose admits a simple interpretation. It states that, in
each period and for each skill, the eﬃcient machine quality and the tightness maximize the social
gain from matching a worker, subject to a zero net-proﬁt condition for each machine.
The objective function in (P00) is the social gain from matching a skill s worker today rather
than tomorrow, as (3.13) indicates. To explain why it is so, suppose that an additional skill
s worker is available for matching in the current period. Allocating this worker to a machine
increases the social value only when the machine has failed to match in the current period, which
9occurs with probability e−B. In this event, the match generates a present value PV(k,s). At
the same time, it destroys the opportunity value of delaying the worker for matching in the next
period, the discounted value of which is λ(s). Thus, the net gain from the additional worker is
e−B [PV(k,s) − λ(s)] = Ω(s).
T h ec o n s t r a i n tf o r( P00), (3.9), requires net proﬁt of (or the social net gain from) a machine
k to be zero, which is necessary for the number of machines to be eﬃcient. To see this, consider
adding a quality k machine to the matching process in the current period, where k ∈ φ(s). This
additional machine gets a match with probability 1 − e−B. However, it also reduces the relative
number of workers to machines in the matching process, and hence crowds out the number of
matches for existing machines, by M ∂
∂M(1 − e−B)=−Be−B. Thus, the social contribution of
this additional machine is (1−e−B −Be−B)(PV −λ). Eq. (3.9) requires this social contribution
to be equal to the cost of the machine in the current period.
For given λ and s, Figure 1 illustrates the solution to (P00). The curve B = IND(k) depicts
the combinations of (k,B) that generate the same level of social net gain from matching with
as k i l ls workers today. This is an upward-sloping curve because when the machine quality
increases, congestion must be higher on the workers’ side in order to keep the workers’ social
v a l u ec o n s t a n t . T h ec u r v eIND(k)i sa l s oc o n c a v e . 9 The curve B = ZNP(k) depicts the zero
net proﬁt condition (3.9). It is upward-sloping because a higher quality machine is more costly
to make, which requires a higher matching rate in order to break even. The eﬃcient assignment
is given by point E, where the two curves are tangent to each other.
Figure 1 here.
For the solution to be unique, the curve IND(k) must be more concave than ZNP(k) when-
ever the two are tangent to each other, i.e., ZNPkk >I N D kk whenever ZNPk = INDk.T h e
following proposition speciﬁes this condition more explicitly and states the existence result (see
Appendix A for a proof).
Proposition 3.4. (Existence) Assume λ(s) ∈ (0, ¯ λ(s)] for some ¯ λ(s) > 0.I f
FkCkk − CkFkk >
(Fk − Ck)[Fk − a(s)Ck]2
[1 − a(s)][F − a(s)C − (1 − a(s))¯ λ(s)]
. (3.15)
then (P00) has a unique solution. That is, φo(s) exists and is a singleton for each s.M o r e o v e r ,
kmin(s) < φo(s) <k max(s) for every s ∈ S,w h e r ekmax(s) and kmin(s) are deﬁned as follows:
[Fk(k,s) − Ck(k)]k=kmax(s) =0 , (3.16)
[F(k,s)Ck(k) − C(k)Fk(k,s)]k=kmin(s) =0 . (3.17)
9This can be veriﬁed using IND(k)=l n [ PV(k,s) − λ(s)] − lnΩ(s).
10Because a unique machine quality is assigned to each skill, mixed matching at the aggregate
level is not eﬃcient. Thus, I will use φo(s) to refer to the level, rather than the set, of machine
quality assigned to skill s. Then, bo(s) ≡ Bo(φo(s),s)i st h ee ﬃcient tightness for skill s in the
period and mo(s) ≡ u(s)/bo(s)i st h ee ﬃcient number of new machines φo(s) assigned to skill s
workers. The numbers bo and φo must satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition (3.11) and the constraint
(3.9) of (P00), which can be rewritten as follows:








Solve bo from (3.18) as a function of φo. Denote this solution as bo = b(φo), where the dependence
on s is suppressed. Substituting this function into (3.19), I can solve φo. Denote this solution as
φo = φ(λ) to emphasize its dependence on the future value of workers.
3.3. The intertemporal link and dynamic stability
Proposition Existence has established existence and uniqueness of the eﬃcient assignment for any
given sequence {λt}t≥0. To characterize the eﬃcient assignment completely, I must determine
the λ sequence by resorting to the analysis of dynamic stability. Because the assignment in the
current period depends on future assignments only through the future value of workers, λ,i ti s
important to analyze ﬁrst how λ aﬀects the current assignment. Suppressing the skill index s,I
summarize such eﬀects by the following lemma:10
Lemma 3.5. (Intertemporal-link) An increase in λ reduces the social net gain from a current
worker, Ω, and increases bo and φo.T h a ti s ,b0(φ) > 0, φ0(λ) > 0 and dΩ/dλ < 0.
An increase in the future value of workers increases the machine quality and the market tight-
ness assigned to current workers. This is intuitive. When the future value of workers increases,
the net gain from a current worker (Ω) falls. In this case, it is socially desirable to reduce the
number of current matches and increase the number of future matches. The only way to do so is
to reduce the number of machines in the current period, i.e., to increase the tightness for workers.
However, reducing the number of machines increases the matching probability for each machine
and hence increases the social net gain from each machine. To maintain zero social net gain from
the machines, the cost of machines must rise, which entails an increase in the machine quality.
Figure 1 shows the eﬀects of λ.W h e nλ increases, the social net gain generated by a machine
today, relative to tomorrow, falls; for a machine to make a zero net proﬁt, its utilization rate
must rise, which requires an increase in B.S o ,t h eZNP(k) curve shifts up, say, to ZNPnew(k).
10The proof, omitted here, involves straightforward diﬀerentiation of (3.18), (3.19), and (3.13) with respect to λ.
11Similarly, an increase in λ reduces the social net gain from matching a worker today relative to
tomorrow; to keep such a social net gain constant, the worker must get a match at a higher rate,
which requires a decrease in B. T h a ti s ,t h ee n t i r em a po fIND(k) curves shifts down for any
given Ω. Notice that neither the ZNP curve nor the IND curve shifts in a parallel fashion.
Rather, the lower the level of k, the larger the shift, because of the complementarity between
skills and machine qualities. If a worker is matched with a low machine quality, his matching
rate must increase by a large amount in order to generate the same net social gain as before the
increase in λ. In the new map of IND curves, one of them is tangent to ZNPnew(k). This is
labelled INDnew(k) in Figure 1, which corresponds to a lower Ω than the original IND curve.
The new assignment is depicted by point E0.
Next, I reduce the dimension of the dynamic system. Substitute the functions b(φ)a n dφ(λ)
into (3.10) to obtain:
λ−1 = Ψ(λ) ≡ a
n
λ + e−b(φ(λ)) [PV(φ(λ)) − λ]
o
. (3.20)
Let ru ≡ u/n be the unemployment rate of the workers of the particular skill. Then (3.5) becomes:







Eqs. (3.20) and (3.21) form a dynamic system for (λ−1,ru), where λ−1 is a jump variable and
ru is a state variable with an initial value ru0 ∈ (0,1).
The following proposition states existence, uniqueness, and local stability of the steady state,
indicated by a superscript ∗ (see Appendix B for a proof):
Proposition 3.6. (Stable) The equilibrium has a unique, saddle-path stable steady state.
Along the saddle path, (λt−1,b t,φt)=( λ∗,b ∗,φ∗) ∀t ≥ 0, while the sequence {rut}t≥0 approaches
the steady state monotonically. Moreover, Conjecture 3.1 is satisﬁed around the steady state.
The social value of workers, λ, is constant over time along the entire dynamic path! This
implies that b and φ are also constant over time for each skill.
The constant time-path of λ is a result of the intertemporal trade-oﬀ. To explain, suppose
λ−1 > λ∗; i.e., the value of workers in the current period exceeds the steady state value. In this
case, it is costly to delay a match to next period. The costs include time discounting and the net
gain Ω from a current match. For it to be eﬃcient to leave some workers for future matches, the
future value of workers (λ) must exceed the steady state value λ∗ suﬃciently to compensate for
these costs. More precisely, (λ − λ∗) must exceed (λ−1 − λ∗)b ym o r et h a n1 /a.H o w e v e r ,t h i s
violates the transversality condition, as the assignment delays too many workers to distant future
matches. By re-allocating some of these workers to current matches, social welfare increases.
Similarly, the situation λ−1 < λ∗ is inconsistent with intertemporal eﬃciency.
12Another way to phrase the above explanation is to calculate the implicit rate of return to
matches. The implicit return is (Ω+λ)a n dt h er a t eo fr e t u r n( Ω+λ)/λ−1.T h ee ﬃcient allocation
requires that this rate of return be equal to the eﬀective discount rate 1/a (see (3.20)). For any
given current value of workers, λ−1,a ni n c r e a s ei nλ reduces Ω (see Lemma Intertemporal-link)
and hence increases the return by less than one for one. If λ−1 > λ∗,t h e n( λ − λ∗) must exceed
(λ−1 − λ∗)b ym o r et h a n1 /a in order to satisfy the eﬃciency requirement on the rate of return.
This violates the transversality condition.
Since (λ,φ,b) are constant over time, I suppress the time subscript on these variables and the
superscript ∗ on the steady state. Substituting λ∗ from (3.20), I can rewrite the condition for




(Fk − aCk)[Fk − a(2 − a)Ck]
(1 − a)
2 (F − aC)
. (3.22)







eb − 1 − b
, (3.24)
where C = C(φ(s)), F = F(φ(s),s), and the superscript o is suppressed.
3.4. Properties of the eﬃcient assignment
With the above stability results, the properties of the assignment become very similar to those in
the one-period setup examined in Shi (2001). In this subsection, I brieﬂy state these properties
for the special case σ(s)=σ.11 The proofs are omitted, as they involve only comparative statics
using (3.23) and (3.24).
Proposition 3.7. (Property) The assignment φ is positive, i.e., φ0(s) > 0, if and only if
Fks >
CFs(Fk − Ck)(Fk − aCk)[Fk − a(2 − a)Ck]
(1 − a)
2 (F − aC)Ck(FCk − CFk)
. (3.25)





Thus, b0(s) ≥ 0 implies φ0(s) > 0,a n dφ0(s) ≤ 0 implies b0(s) < 0. Under (v) in Assumption
Regularity, there is a non-empty parameter region in which both φ0(s) > 0 and b0(s) < 0.
11By continuity, the same properties will hold if σ(s) does not decrease signiﬁcantly in s.
13For the eﬃcient machine assignment to be positively assortative, skills and machine qualities
must be suﬃciently complementary with each other. To understand this result, consider the case
Fks ≈ 0, in which (3.25) is violated. Since high-quality machines are costly to make, the utilization
rates of high-quality machines and high-skill workers are low if the assignment is positive. If,
instead, the planner assigns high-skill workers to match with medium- or low-quality machines
and high-quality machines to match with medium- or low-skill workers, the utilization rates
of both high-quality machines and high-skill workers will increase signiﬁcantly. Since machine
qualities and skills are barely complementary with each other in this case, the eﬃciency gain from
the increase in utilization outweighs the loss of productivity from the non-positive assignment.
So, expected social surplus will increase.
The eﬃcient assignment also implies socially eﬃcient compensations for workers, or the eﬃ-
cient wage rates. Let wo(s)d e n o t et h ee ﬃcient wage rate for skill s workers. The present value
of expected eﬃcient wages must be equal to the social net gain from matching a worker. Thus,
Ω = µwo+(1−µ)aΩ+1,w h e r eµ =( 1 −e−b)/b is the worker’s matching probability. Since Ω+1 = Ω
along the stable path, wo = Ω[1 − (1 − µ)a]/µ.C a l c u l a t i n g Ω = e−b(PV − λ), substituting F
with (3.24) and suppressing the superscript o,Ih a v e :
w =
C(φ)







Proposition 3.8. (Social-value) The social gain from matching a worker today relative to to-
morrow, Ω(s), and the social value of workers, λ(s), are increasing functions of the skill, regardless
of the signs of φ0(s) and b0(s).I fφ0(s) ≥ 0,t h e nw0(s) > 0.M o r e o v e r ,w0(s) <F s(φ(s),s) if and
only if b0(s) < 0.
The social gain from matching a worker and the social value of workers always increase with
the skill level, even when the assignment is non-positive. This is intuitive because high skills
are more productive resources than low skills. If a non-positive assignment is called for, it is to
increase utilization of highly productive resources. Such an assignment could not be eﬃcient if
high-skill workers yielded lower social values than low-skill workers.
However, the actual wage rate does not necessarily increase with the skill level, especially
when the assignment is non-positive. When a high skill is assigned to a machine with a very low
quality, the actual output per period is low, which implies a low actual wage. This outcome does
not violate the eﬃciency requirement λ0(s) > 0o rΩ0(s) > 0 because the high skill is utilized with
a much higher probability than a low skill.
Proposition Social-value also states that the marginal reward to skill, w0(s), is less than the
marginal product of skill if and only if the matching rate increases with skill. If the wage rate
over-compensates for a skill’s marginal product, it must be the case that the skill is matched at a
low rate. If the wage rate compensates for the skill’s marginal product deﬁciently, then the skill
14must be compensated additionally by a higher matching rate. When the compensation through
an increased matching probability is suﬃcient, the wage can even fall with skill.
4. Decentralization
To decentralize the eﬃcient assignment, consider a competitive economy with the following fea-
tures. Machine makers produce machines and rent them to ﬁr m sa tt h ec o m p e t i t i v em a r k e tr a t e .
Each quality k machine is rented for C(k) per period. In each period, the ﬁrms and workers take
the following sequence of actions:
(i) The ﬁrms can target any machine quality to unemployed workers of a particular skill.
When contemplating a machine quality kt for a skill s,aﬁrm expects to face a market tightness,
Bt(kt,s), which is determined by a zero-proﬁt condition for entry. That is, the ﬁrm anticipates
that many other ﬁrms can make the same pairing to drive net expect proﬁt to zero.
(ii) Taking the tightness schedule as given, the ﬁrms select machine qualities φt(s)f o re a c hs k i l l
s and choose a wage path {Wτ(kt,s)}τ≥t for kt ∈ φt(s). Then all ﬁrms simultaneously announce
the skills they target the machines to and the corresponding wages. The ﬁrms must commit to
hiring these skills and paying these wages. As before, the selection rule cannot be lexicographic.
This implies that the ﬁrms will target each machine to only one skill level in equilibrium, as
shown in section 5.
(iii) Observing the ﬁrms’ announcements, unemployed workers decide which ﬁrm to apply
to, possibly with mixed strategies.12 If a ﬁrm receives applicants of the skill it committed to, it
randomly chooses one. The pair produces and the worker is paid according to the posted wage
path until the pair separates. If a ﬁrm fails to recruit any worker of the desired skill, output is
zero in the current period. In the event of a match failure or separation, the ﬁrm can return the
machine (if undepreciated) to the owner and choose a machine optimally next period.
I solve this equilibrium assignment problem in each period backward. Although a ﬁrm an-
nounces the machine quality and wage rates simultaneously, it is convenient to analyze the choice
of wages ﬁrst for any given choice of machine quality k, as I will do below.
4.1. Wages for newly recruited skill s workers
Given the ﬁrms’ choices of machines and commitments to particular skills, consider the recruiting
game in period t. Since the ﬁrms with machines other than φt(s)c o m m i tt on o th i r i n gs k i l ls,
unemployed skill s workers, and only those workers, apply to vacancies with machines φt(s). For
the recruiting game in period t, I can then isolate skill s workers and the machines of a quality
kt ∈ φt(s). Let Mt(kt,s) be the number of machines kt ∈ φt(s) chosen for skill s. I suppress the
12The qualitative results will be similar if each worker observes only two independently drawn announcements
in each group of ﬁrms, but the exercise is more cumbersome (see Acemoglu and Shimer 1999).
15index s in this subsection, referring to an unemployed skill s worker as an unemployed worker
and to a new machine kt in the group φt(s)a sam a c h i n ekt.
Iw i l lﬁrst analyze skill s workers’ application decisions and then the ﬁrms’ wage decisions.
Focus on the symmetric equilibrium where all unemployed workers of the same skill use the same
strategy and all recruiting ﬁrms that choose the same machine quality for the same skill use the
same strategy. This focus is justiﬁed by the focus on the limit economy with large numbers ut(s)
and Mt(kt,s) (but with a ﬁnite ratio ut(s)/Mt(kt,s)), where it is diﬃcult for agents to coordinate
on asymmetric equilibria, including pure-strategy equilibria.13
Let me compute the matching rates in equilibrium. Denote p(kt) as the probability with
which an unemployed worker applies to a ﬁrm with machine kt. Denote the equilibrium tightness
for each machine kt by
Bt(kt) ≡ limutp(kt),
where the limit is taken over ut →∞with Mt (kt)/ut ∈ (0,∞). Each recruiting ﬁrm with a
machine kt ﬁlls the vacancy in period t with probability
1 − [1 − p(kt)]
ut → 1 − e−Bt(kt).
S i m i l a r l y ,e a c hu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e rg e t saj o bi np e r i o dt with a probability







These are the matching rates used in the social planner’s problem.
Next, I compute equilibrium payoﬀs. Denote Aτ(kt)=Wτ(kt)/F(kt) as the wage share
for period τ ≥ t posted by a ﬁrm recruiting in period t with machine kt.F o r T ≥ t,d e n o t e
AT(kt) ≡ {Aτ(kt)}τ≥T.L e t JfT(AT(kt)) be the present value to a ﬁrm from period T onward
of a utilized machine kt that successfully recruited in period t with a wage share path At(kt).
Let JvT(kt) be the present value from period T onward of a vacant machine kt. Similarly, let
VeT(AT(kt)) be the present value from period T onward to a worker who has been employed from
period t with a machine kt and a wage share path At(kt), and VuT be the present value of an
unemployed worker in period T. These value functions obey the following Bellman equations:





Jft(At(kt)) + e−Bt(kt)βJvt+1(kt+1); (4.3)
Vet(At(kt)) = At(kt)F(kt)+σβVut+1 + aVet+1(At+1(kt)); (4.4)
13Of course, I allow ﬁrms to use diﬀerent strategies if they wish to target diﬀerent machine qualities to the same
skill or target the same machine quality to diﬀerent skills. Similarly, workers of the same skill can use diﬀerent
strategies when applying to diﬀerent machine qualities in the set φt(s). Moreover, ﬁrms that recruit in diﬀerent
periods do not have to use the same strategies even if they use the same machine quality to target the same skill.
16Vut = µt(kt)Vet(At(kt)) + [1 − µt(kt)]βVut+1. (4.5)
These equations are standard in search theory of unemployment. For example, (4.3) equates the
present value of a vacancy to the expected value from hiring minus the vacancy cost C.W i t h
probability 1 − e−B the job is ﬁlled, in which case the job yields a present value Jft.W i t h
probability e−B the vacancy remains unﬁlled in period t, in which case the ﬁrm can choose
possibly a diﬀerent machine to post a vacancy yielding a value βJvt+1(kt+1). Note that, unlike
(Jf,V e), the future values of (Jv,V u) do not depend on speciﬁc ﬁrms’ wage oﬀers.
Now consider a single recruiting ﬁrm in the unit (kt,s)t h a td e v i a t e st oad i ﬀerent wage share
path Ad
t(kt) ≡ {Ad
τ(kt)}τ≥t, where the superscript d indicates deviation. All other recruiting
ﬁrms in the unit (kt,s) continue to post the share path At(kt). If the deviating ﬁrm succeeds in
hiring a worker in t, it pays wages according to the share path Ad
t(kt) until the job is separated.
For the deviator, the present value of a ﬁlled job is Jft(Ad
t(kt)), computed in the same way as














The surplus to the ﬁrm from ﬁlling the job is Jft(Ad
t(kt)) − βJvt+1(kt+1). Similarly, if an unem-
ployed worker is hired by the deviating ﬁrm in period t, the worker receives a path of wage shares
Ad
t(kt) until the pair separates. The present value of the match to the worker is Vet(Ad
t(kt)).











The surplus is Vet(Ad
t(kt)) − βVut+1 to the worker.14
Let pd
t(kt) be the probability with which each unemployed worker applies to the deviator.
The deviator has a tightness limutpd
t(kt) ≡ Bd
t (kt) and a matching probability 1−e−Bd
t (kt).E a c h







ES be expected surplus that a worker can obtain in the market, which is unaﬀected by a single
ﬁrm’s deviation (see Burdett et al., 2001). Then the deviator’s wage decision solves:15
EPd




















14Note that, if the pair separates or if the job remains unﬁlled in a period, the ﬁrm reverts to the equilibrium
strategy. So, the future value of a vacancy is Jvt+1(kt+1), which is unaﬀected by the ﬁrm’s current deviation.
Similarly, the continuation payoﬀ to the worker who fails to get a match or separates from a match in t is unaﬀected
by the ﬁrm’s deviation.
15This problem is equivalent to choosing the wage path to maximize the deviator’s value of a vacancy, J
d
v(kt),




t )r e p l a c i n g( At,B t).
17The constraint requires that the expected surplus of a worker applying to the deviator be higher
than or equal to the market surplus; otherwise, the deviator would not be able to attract any of
the targeted workers. If the inequality “ > ” is strict, then the deviator will attract all the targeted
workers, which implies Bd →∞and (1 − e−Bd
)/Bd → 0 in the large market, contradicting the
strict inequality “ > ”. Thus, the constraint must hold with equality.
If equilibrium wage shares are At(kt), then there cannot be any proﬁtable deviation. So, the
above problem must be solved by Ad
t(kt)=At(kt), which implies pd(kt)=p(kt)a n dBd
t (kt)=




eBt(kt)−1 [Vet(At(kt)) − βVut+1 + Jft(At(kt)) − βJvt+1(kt+1)].
(4.8)





of the total match surplus.
With (4.8), a worker’s expected surplus ES and the ﬁrm’s expected surplus EP are as follows
for given k:
ESt = e−Bt(kt) [PV(kt) − ξt]; (4.9)
EPt(kt)=
h
1 − (1 + Bt(kt))e−Bt(kt)
i
[PV(kt) − ξt], (4.10)
where PV is deﬁned in (3.1) and
ξt ≡ β [Vut+1 + Jvt+1(kt+1)] − σβ
∞ X
τ=0
aτ[Vut+1+τ + Jvt+1+τ(kt+1+τ)]. (4.11)
4.2. Market tightness and assignment
Now I determine the choice of machine qualities. To do so, I need to specify the market tightness
schedule {Bt(kt,s)}s∈S,kt∈R+,t≥0. This schedule ensures the value of a vacancy to be zero for all
possible pairs (kt,s)a n da l lt ≥ 0, i.e., Jvt(kt,s) = 0 for all (kt,s)a n da l lt, provided that output
from the pair (kt,s) is at least as high as the cost of the machine. If output from a pair (kt,s)
is less than the machine cost, then Jvt(kt,s) < 0, in which case no ﬁrm will choose kt for s in
period t and so Bt(kt,s)=∞. From (4.3) one can show that
Jvt(kt) − βJvt+1(kt+1)=EPt(kt,s) − C(kt).
With (4.10), the zero-proﬁt condition is:
(
1 − [1 + Bt(kt,s)]e−Bt(kt,s) =
C(kt)
PV(kt,s)−ξt, if C(kt) ≤ F(kt,s)
Bt(kt,s)=∞, otherwise.
(4.12)
This speciﬁes a tightness for every pair (kt,s), not just for the pairs observed in equilibrium.
For pairs (k0
t,s), where k0
t / ∈ φt(s), (4.12) is a restriction on beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path,,
18which can be rationalized by the entry competition. That is, when contemplating the choice of a
quality k0
t / ∈ φt(s)f o rs k i l ls,aﬁrm expects that other ﬁrms can do the same and the perceived
competition leaves each ﬁrm with a non-positive expected net proﬁt.
Taking the schedule {Bt(kt,s)}s∈S,kt∈R+,t≥0 as given, the ﬁrms compete with each other by
choosing the machine qualities to target the workers. For each skill level s, the choice of machine









In this problem, ξt is taken as given by each recruiting ﬁrm since it depends only on future values
{Vut+τ}τ≥1 that are determined by the actions of all ﬁrms.
4.3. Equilibrium and eﬃciency
An equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.1. An equilibrium consists of an assignment φ, a path of wage shares A,a n da
schedule of market tightness B such that the following conditions hold:
(i) For each pair (k,s), the tightness B(k,s) satisﬁes (4.12);
(ii) Given the tightness schedule and that other ﬁrms’ choices follow the equilibrium path, it is
ex ante optimal for a ﬁrm to choose a quality k ∈ φ(s) to target skill s workers and post the path
of wage shares A.
Compare the equilibrium problem (Pe) with the social planner’s problem (P00). These two
problems are identical to each other iﬀ ξ = λ. Because ξ = λ indeed, as shown in Appendix B,
the following proposition holds.
Proposition 4.2. (Coincide) The market assignment is identical to the eﬃcient one for all t.
Thus, under the conditions in Proposition Existence, φt(s) is a singleton for each s.
This eﬃciency result is much stronger than in the one-period model (Shi 2001), because the
equilibrium decentralizes the eﬃcient allocation in every period. In fact, the one-period model
corresponds to the special case where a → 0( i . e . ,β → 0). Moreover, the proof of the above
proposition does not rely on the stability result that λ is constant over time.
Key to the eﬃciency is the result that an unemployed worker’s expected surplus in equilibrium
(ES) equals expected social gain from matching a worker today (Ω). Three factors are important
for this equality. First, the decision rights are allocated properly. The agents who actively create
matches, i.e., the ﬁrms, decide the split of the match surplus by posting wages. In contrast to the
arbitrary surplus division through ex post Nash bargaining (e.g., Diamond 1982, Mortensen 1982,
and Pissarides 1990), the proper allocation of decision rights ensures that the wage share reﬂects
19workers’ marginal contribution to the social surplus, a reminiscence of the condition identiﬁed
by Hosios (1990). Second, there is full-ﬂedged competition, not only in the sense of free entry of
ﬁrms but also in the sense that each worker knows the wages posted by all ﬁrms (but see footnote
12). In contrast to limited competition in the sear c hl i t e r a t u r es u r v e y e di nM c M i l l a n( 1 9 9 4 ) ,
where each worker ﬁnds one wage at a time, full-ﬂedged competition ensures that ﬁrms select
the machine quality to maximize the skill’s social marginal value. Finally, ﬁrms can commit to
the posted wage and to the speciﬁc skill they advertized for. This enables ﬁrms to target an
optimal machine quality to each skill, thus inducing ex ante eﬃciency, although the ﬁrms may
have incentive to consider a diﬀerent skill ex post when it fails to be matched.
Equilibrium wages in the above market mechanism are equal to eﬃcient compensations to
skills. Recovering w(s) from (4.8), one can verify that it coincides with (3.27). Since (φt,b t)a r e
constant over time by Proposition Stable, the wage rate wt(s) is also constant over time.
5. Each Machine Is Assigned to a Single Skill
In previous sections I have presumed that each machine is assigned to a unique skill. In this
section I show that this is an endogenous outcome. Then I discuss Assumption Not-lexicographic
that is used for establishing this one-to-one feature of the assignment.
5.1. One-to-one assignment
Consider a multiple-skill assignment φd that assigns each machine of a particular quality kd to
m a t c hw i t hb o t hs k i l l ss1 and s2,w h e r es1 >s 2. Without loss of generality, assume that kd is the
only machine quality that receives multiple assignments and the only machine quality assigned
to s1 and s2.L e t p e r i o d τ be the period in which the multiple-skill assignment occurs. I will
describe the eﬃciency requirements in period τ, but often suppress the subscript τ.L e tQ be the
number of quality kd machines and qiQ the number of unemployed skill si workers assigned to
m a t c hw i t he a c ho t h e ri np e r i o dτ,w h e r ei =1 ,2. Refer to this group of machines and workers
as unit (kd,s 1,s 2). The variables (q1,q 2,Q,kd)a r ec h o i c e s .
Because the assignment φd allocates multiple skills to match with a machine, it must specify
how the skills are selected ex post (after match) to produce with the machine. Let xi be the
probability that the worker selected for a quality kd machine is a skill si worker, conditional on
that both skills show up at the match, where i =1 ,2. Clearly, x1 +x2 =1 .B yc h o o s i n g( x1,x 2),
the assignment can give one of the two skills a higher selection priority probabilistically. However,
Assumption Not-lexicographic requires 0 <x i < 1f o ri =1 ,2.16
In the presence of the multiple-skill assignment, I must modify the matching rates. Let i0 6= i
and i,i0 ∈ {1,2}. Consider a particular machine in the unit (kd,s 1,s 2). When targeting the two
16Here x1 and x2 are independent of the numbers of skill s1 and s2 workers that the machine receives, provided
that the machine receives both. This assumption simpliﬁes the calculation, but it is not critical for the result.
20skills, a machine will be paired with a skill si worker with the following probability:
¡
1 − e−qi¢£
e−qi0 + xi(1 − e−qi0)
¤
.
The explanation is as follows. For the machine to pair with a skill si worker, one or more skill si
workers must apply to the job, which occurs with probability (1 − e−qi). In this case, the job is
given to a skill si worker either because no skill si0 worker has applied to the job, which occurs
with probability e−qi0, or because some skill si0 workers have applied but none of them is chosen,
which occurs with probability xi(1 − e−qi0).
Proposition 5.1. (One-to-one) Under Assumption Not-lexicographic, it is neither socially ef-
ﬁcient nor consistent with an equilibrium to assign each machine to multiple skill levels.
Consider the eﬃcient assignment ﬁrst. For the unit (kd,s 1,s 2), the social planner chooses
(kd,Q,q 1,q 2)a n d( x1,x 2). When a machine kd pairs with a skill si worker, it generates a social
value PV(kd,s i). The expected surplus generated by all machines and workers in the unit is
EV(kd,s 1,s 2) ≡ Q
(
(1 − e−q1)[e−q2 + x1 (1 − e−q2)]PV(kd,s 1)
+(1− e−q2)
h




Let Z be the collection of subsets of S to which φd assigns machines, with z ∈ Z b e i n gat y p i c a l











t (z)=∅ if t = τ and z = {(s1,s 2)}; otherwise, Kd
t (z)=φd
t(z).
T h ec o n s t r a i n t s( 3 . 5 )a n d( 3 . 6 )m u s ta l s ob er e v i s e df o rsi.F o c u s i n go np e r i o dτ and using
subscript +t to stand for τ + t, the following constraints must hold for i =1 ,2:
u+1(si)=σ(si)n(si)+[ 1− σ(si)]{u(si) − (1 − e−qi)[e−qi0 + xi(1 − e−qi0)]Q},
qiQ = u(si).
Let the multiplier of the ﬁr s tc o n s t r a i n tb eλd(si)/[1−σ(si)] and of the second constraint Ωd(si).
Then, the social marginal value of current unemployed si workers is λd
−1(si)/[1 − σ(si)]. The
value λd must satisfy a transversality condition similar to (3.8).
Suppose, contrary to Proposition One-to-one, that the above multiple-skill assignment is
eﬃcient. Because x1 and x2 must lie in the interior of (0,1), their ﬁrst-order conditions imply:
PV(kd,s 1) − λd(s1)=PV(kd,s 2) − λd(s2). (5.1)
That is, a current match must yield the same surplus, no matter a skill s1 or s2 worker is selected
ex post. If the economy lasts for only one period, a(si)=0a n dλd (si) = 0. Because PV (k,s)i s
21an increasing function of s, the above condition is violated in this case and so the multiple-skill
assignment is not eﬃcient. When the economy lasts for an inﬁnite horizon, I invoke the stability
requirement to derive a contradiction. The procedure is as follows.
First, I derive the ﬁrst-order conditions for (q1,q 2,Q,kd). Clearly, Q>0, q1 > 0a n dq2 > 0
for the unit (kd,s 1,s 2)t ob eap a r to ft h ee ﬃcient assignment. Denote q ≡ q1 + q2. Under (5.1),
the ﬁrst-order conditions for (qi,Q,kd) and the envelope condition for u(si)a r ea sf o l l o w s :
Ωd(s1)=Ωd(s2)=e−q
h




1 − (1 + q)e−q¤h





[e−q2 + x1 (1 − e−q2)](1 − e−q1)PVk(kd,s 1)








, for i =1 ,2. (5.5)
These conditions can be interpreted easily by adapting the interpretations for the corresponding
conditions in the single-skill assignment. In particular, (5.2) requires that the tightness qi equate
expected social surpluses generated by assigning skills s1 and s2 to quality kd machines.
Second, because 0 <x i < 1f o ri ∈ {1,2} and PVk(kd,s 1) >PV k(kd,s 2), (5.4) implies




Moreover, (5.1), (5.3) and (5.2) solve for (kd,q,Ωd) as functions of (λd(s1),λd(s2)). Denote the





Ck(kd) − (1 − e−q)PVk(kd,s i0)
i
PVk(kd,s 1) − PVk(kd,s 2)
, for i,i0 ∈ {1,2} and i0 6= i.
The condition (5.6) implies G1 < 0a n dG2 < 0. Also G1 + G2 +1> 0.
Third, I invoke the stability requirement. Suppose that the multiple-skill assignment converges
to a steady state, where the social marginal value of si workers is denoted λd∗(si). Linearizing
















The properties of Gi and the fact a(s1) ≥ a(s2) imply that the two eigenvalues of the Jacobian
matrix in the above system are both less than or equal to a(s1), and hence strictly less than β.
The same result for the eigenvalues holds for any period where the multiple-skill assignment
applies. Also, the proof of Proposition Stable establishes a similar result for a single-skill as-












are strictly less than β, regardless of how long
the multiple-skill assignment will last. If λd
+(t−1)(si) 6= λd∗(si) for any t ≥ 0a n di ∈ {1,2},t h e n
limT→∞ βTλd
+T(si) 6= 0, which violates the transversality condition. Therefore, the system must
have λd
+(t−1)(si)=λd∗(si) for all t ≥ 0. Similarly, Ωd
+t is constant over time. I will then suppress
the superscript ∗ below.
Finally, I deduce a contradiction to (5.1). Setting λd
−1(si)=λd(si) in (5.5) to calculate λd(si)
and using the deﬁnition of PV,Ih a v e




F(kd,s i) − C(kd) − Ωd
i
. (5.7)
Note that Ωd is the same for s1 and s2 by (5.2). The cost C(kd)i sa l s ot h es a m ef o rs1 and
s2. Since (5.2) and (5.3) imply PV(kd,s i) − λd(si) − C(kd) − Ωd = qΩd > 0, it is clear that
F(kd,s i) − C(kd) − Ωd > 0f o ri =1 ,2. Then, the right-hand side of (5.7) is larger for i =1
than for i = 2, implying a contradiction to (5.1). Therefore, it is socially ineﬃcient to assign each
machine to multiple skills.
Now I show that the multiple-skill assignment is also inconsistent with an equilibrium. Sup-
pose that a ﬁrm uses the above multiple-skill assignment φd in a period τ.C a l l t h i s ﬁrm the
deviating ﬁrm. Use the subscript +t to stand for τ + t.L e t Ad
(+t)(si) be the wage share (of
output) that this ﬁrm promises to pay to an si worker in period τ + t. The share path is
Ad(si)={Ad
(+t)(si)}t≥0, which is announced at time τ. I suppress the machine quality kd when-
ever it is possible.
Denote pd
i as the probability with which each si worker applies to this ﬁrm. Let qi =l i muipd
i.
For the ﬁrm to attract si workers, qi > 0. The deviating ﬁrm’s expected surplus is











Here the hiring probabilities have the same expressions as in the planner’s problem and Jd
f(si)i s









(+t)(si))F(kd,s i) − a(si)C(kd)+σ(si)βJv(+t+1)
i
.








e (si) − βVu(+1)(si)
i
≥ ESi,f o ri =1 ,2,
where Vu(si) is the market value of an unemployed si worker and ESi the expected surplus of
an si worker in the market. The employment probability of an si applicant to the deviator can
be intuitively understood as the probability with which the ﬁrm hires an si worker, divided by
23the expected number of si applicants that the ﬁrm receives (qi). The value function V d
e (si)i st h e












Under the maintained assumption xi ∈ (0,1) for i =1 ,2, the ﬁrst-order conditions for xi must
hold. Combining these conditions with the ﬁrst-order conditions for (A+t(s1),A +t(s2)) and the
equilibrium condition Jvt =0f o ra l lt,Ih a v e
Jd
f(s1)+V d
e (s1) − βVu(+1)(s1)=Jd
f(s2)+V d
e (s2) − βVu(+1)(s2). (5.8)
The formulas of Jd




e (si) − βVu(+1)(si)=PVd(si) − ξ(si),
where ξ is deﬁned in (4.11) (note that Jv = 0). Since ξ(si)=λ(si), as shown in Appendix B,
the condition (5.8) is identical to (5.1). So, the same procedure can be used to show that this
condition is violated. This completes the proof of Proposition One-to-one.
5.2. Discussion
In similar environments but with only one period, Shi (forthcoming) and Shimer (2001a) have
shown that the eﬃcient assignment is lexicographic. Since eﬃciency is the focus in the current
paper, it is necessary to explain why I exclude lexicographic assignments.
The primary reason is tractability. Lexicographic assignments can be exceedingly complicated
in an inﬁnite-horizon economy. To see this, suppose that a quality k machine is assigned to match
with skills (s1,s 2,s 3), with the lexicographic selection rule that s1 is selected before s2 and s2
before s3,w h e r es1 >s 2 >s 3. Because there are many other quality k machines and there is
a lack of coordination, each quality k machine fails to receive a skill s1 worker with a strictly
positive probability. Suppose that this failure occurs but the machine receives one or more skill
s2 w o r k e r . I nt h i sc a s e ,i tm a yb eo p t i m a lt oa w a r dt h ej o bi nt h ec u r r e n tp e r i o dt oas k i l ls2
worker and continue to search for an s1 worker next period. So, the assignment next period
will depend directly on the distribution of received workers in the current period, as well as the
number of unemployed workers available for matches next period. Since the ﬁrm may again fail
to receive an s1 worker next period, the assignment two periods in the future will depend on the
distributions of received workers in the current and next period. In the end, the assignment will
depend on the distributions of received workers in all past periods. To solve for the eﬃcient (or
equilibrium) assignment, one must solve for the entire time-path of the skill distributions over
24the machines of each quality, and do so for all machine qualities employed. It is very diﬃcult to
solve for these distributions.17
The complexity arises in two other related dimensions. First, with a multiple skill assignment,
the threshold skill level assigned to match with a particular machine quality may vary over time.
As in Shimer (2001b), the eﬃcient assignment may never converge to a steady state. Second,
lexicographic assignments seem inconsistent with the assumption that only unemployed workers
participate in the matching process. There is a gain in eﬃciency from allowing machines that are
matched but not with the most desirable workers to continue to seek for a better match. Allowing
for such on-the-job search in a directed-search environment is an interesting direction of research
yet to be explored.
Moreover, lexicographic assignments are special mechanisms that allow the allocation to be
conditional on the realization of the matching process. So are various types of auction (see Julien
et al. 2000). The class of such assignments can be very large, depending on what the assignments
are allowed to be conditional on. It is not clear which degree of conditioning is more reasonable.
Finally, the assignment under Assumption Not-lexicographic provides a benchmark against
which one can measure the additional eﬃciency gain from allowing for lexicographic assignments.
When lexicographic assignments are permitted, it is still true that the most preferred skill for
each machine is unique. The other skills assigned to match with the same machine are just
“back-ups”, and they increase eﬃciency only when the most preferred skill fails to show up at
the match. This gain is much smaller than the gain emphasized in the current paper, namely,
that achieved by switching from an undirected search to directed search.
6. Conclusion
In this paper I study the assignment between machines of heterogeneous qualities and workers of
heterogeneous skills in an inﬁnite-horizon economy with matching frictions. I ﬁrst characterize
the eﬃcient allocation and then the decentralizing market equilibrium.
The eﬃcient assignment has the following properties. (i) The assignment is one-to-one, i.e.,
it assigns the workers of each skill to a unique quality of machines. (ii) It is dynamically stable.
(iii) The eﬃcient assignment is non-positive in every period if skills and machine qualities are
not suﬃciently complementary with each other. (iv) If the machine quality assignment is non-
positive, then high-skill workers must have higher matching rates than low-skill workers. (v)
Eﬃcient wage rates are increasing functions of the skill level when the assignment is positive, but
not always so when the assignment is non-positive. The marginal compensations for skills are
less than the skills’ marginal products if and only if high-skill workers have higher matching rates
17Such distributions are unimportant only when the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between the skill levels it chooses to target.
This indiﬀerence is precisely what Assumption Not-lexicographic imposes on multiple-skill assignments and why it
makes the analysis tractable here.
25than low-skill workers. (vi) Finally, the social value of workers always increases in the skill level,
regardless of the assortative property of the assignment.
A particular market mechanism can decentralize the entire time path of the eﬃcient assign-
ment. In this mechanism, the ﬁrms enter the market in each period under free entry and compete
for workers by announcing the machine qualities they choose, the skill levels to which the ma-
chines are targeted, and wage rates. Important for eﬃciency is that the ﬁrms commit to the
announced machines, skills and wages. Those announcements direct the workers’ search and
internalize matching externalities.
Saddle-path stability plays an important role in establishing the above results. Along the
stable path, the social value of workers is constant over time to ensure that the trade-oﬀ between
current and future matches is eﬃcient. Also, the machine quality, the market tightness, and the
wage rate for each skill are all time-invariant.
The results in this paper not only predict the patterns of the assignment and wage inequality
in the steady state, they are also useful for analyzing how these patterns respond dynamically to
shocks. For example, consider an unanticipated reduction in the cost of producing machines. At
the time of the shock, the assignment jumps immediately to the new steady state level. That is,
unemployed workers are assigned to match with the new machine quality. In contrast, workers
w h ow e r ee m p l o y e da tt h et i m eo ft h es h o c kw i l ls t a yw i t ht h eo l dm a c h i n ea s s i g n m e n t s ;o n l y
after separation will they be assigned for matches according to the new steady state assignment.
B e c a u s ew o r k e r so ft h es a m es k i l la r em a t c h e dw i t hd i ﬀerent machine qualities during the tran-
sition, the assignment is mixed at the aggregate level. Consequently, there is a wage diﬀerential
among workers of the same skill. This within-group wage inequality disappears as the economy
converges to the new steady state. These dynamic responses may be useful for explaining the
observed time pattern of wage inequality in recent decades.
I have abstracted from many realistic aspects of the labor market, and so the model allows
for useful extensions in the future. On the assignment, one can introduce multi-dimensional
skills, match-speciﬁc productivity, private information and/or uncertainty in productivity. With
these elements one can examine how ﬁrms use wages to retain workers and reveal productivity,
in addition to the ex ante role of attracting workers. On inequality, one can introduce human
capital accumulation and analyze how inequality can persist along a balanced growth path.
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28Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition Existence
First, let me reformulate the problem (P00). Denote Θ(x)=1−(1+x)e−x.S i n c eΘ(x) is strictly













Since this problem involves only skill s workers, I suppress the index s in this proof.
Next, let me ﬁnd the bounds on the maximizers of ω(k). For the upper bound, notice that
θ0 = eθ/θ =
³











(Fk − aCk) − Ck
)
.
Any maximizer of ω(k)m u s ts a t i s f yCk ≤ Fk; otherwise ω0(k) < 0, in which case ω(k)c o u l d
be increased by reducing k.S i n c e kmax satisﬁes Ck = Fk and since (Ck − Fk)i sa ni n c r e a s i n g
function of k,t h er e q u i r e m e n tCk ≤ Fk is equivalent to k ≤ kmax for all k ∈ φo.
The lower bound on the maximizer of ω(k)i skmin. To see this, note that the function
[F(k)Ck(k) − C(k)Fk(k)] is an increasing function of k. It is negative at k = 0 and positive at
k = kmax.T h u s , kmin is well-deﬁned and kmin <k max. Suppose that k0 maximizes ω(k), with

















1−a [C(k0)Fk(k0) − F(k0)Ck(k0)] + Ck(k0)λ
o
> 0.
The ﬁrst equality follows from (3.9), and the last inequality from the supposed condition C(k0)Fk(k0) ≥
F(k0)Ck(k0). Since ω0(k0) > 0, and kmin (>k 0)i sf e a s i b l e ,k0 cannot possibly maximize ω(k). A
contradiction. Thus, all solutions for k m u s tb eg r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt okmin.
The above arguments show that ω0(k) > 0a tk = kmin and ω0(k) < 0a tk = kmax.T h u s ,
ω(k) has at least one maximum in (kmin,k max), and all such maxima satisfy ω0(k)=0 .T os h o w
that ω(k)h a sau n i q u em a x i m u m ,i ts u ﬃces to show that ω00(k) < 0 whenever ω0(k)=0i nt h e
domain (kmin,k max)( I fω(k) has a second maximum, then it must also have a minimum, at which
ω00(k) > 0.) The latter requirement is equivalent to





F − aC − (1 − a)λ
,
which is guaranteed by (3.15) for all λ < ¯ λ.Q E D
B. Proofs of Propositions Stable and Coincide
For Proposition Stable, recall that Ω = e−b (PV − λ)a n ddΩ/dλ < 0. Then, 0 < Ψ0(λ) <a<β.
When λ =0 ,φ(0) ∈ (kmin,k max)a n db(φ(0)) ∈ (0,∞). Thus, Ψ(0) > 0. When λ is suﬃciently
29large so that the right-hand side of (3.19) approaches one, b →∞ , φ → kmax and so Ψ → aλ < λ.
Since Ψ0 > 0, these properties imply that there is a unique value λ∗ that satisﬁes Ψ(λ∗)=λ∗.I t
is then easy to see from (3.21) that there is a unique steady state value of ru.
To show that this steady state is locally stable, notice that the dynamics of λ (given by (3.20))
are autonomous, except for the value at t =0 ,a n dt h a t0< Ψ0 <a .I f|λ0 − λ∗| 6= 0, then the
sequence {|λt − λ∗|}t≥0 deﬁned by (3.20) increases monotonically at a rate greater than 1/a >
1/β. This will violate the transversality condition (3.8). Thus, the only rational expectations
solution is λt = λ∗ for all t ≥ 0. This implies φt = φ∗ and b(φt)=b∗ for all t ≥ 0. Substituting
λ = λ∗, (3.21) becomes a linear diﬀerence equation of ru,w h e r et h er o o ti sp o s i t i v ea n dl e s st h a n
one. So, for any initial value ru0 ∈ (0,1), this equation determines a unique sequence {rut}t≥0
that monotonically approaches ru∗.
To verify Conjecture 3.1, let k ∈ φ(s). (The conjecture is trivially satisﬁed if k/ ∈ φ(s)f o r
every s ∈ S.) Because quality k machines are assigned only to skill s workers in all periods
and each machine is paired with one worker, the total number of quality k machines that are
employed in period t before separation is Et(s). A fraction σ−ρ of these machines will be vacant
and undepreciated at the end of the period after separation. In addition, there are mt(s)e−b(s)
number of quality k machines that failed to match in the period, a fraction (1 − ρ)o fw h i c h
will remain at the end of the period. So, the total number of quality k machines that are
vacant at the end of period t is (σ − ρ)Et(s)+( 1− ρ)mt(s)e−b(s). Conjecture 3.1 requires this
number to be less than or equal to mt+1(s). Using mt(s)=ut(s)/b(s), ut(s)=rut(s)n(s), and
Et(s)=[ n(s) − ut+1(s)]/(1 − σ(s)), I can be express this requirement as follows:
rut+1(s) ≥ (σ − ρ)[1 − rut+1(s)]b(s)/(1 − σ(s)) + (1 − ρ)rut(s)e−b(s).
Calculating the steady state value of ru from (3.21), one can verify that the above condition holds
with strict inequality in the steady state. So, it holds in a neighborhood of the steady state. This
completes the proof of Proposition Stable.
For Proposition Coincide, it suﬃces to show ξt = λt for all t. For this, I show that the sequence
{ξt}t≥0 obeys (3.10), the process for λt.W i t hJvt =0f o ra l lt and with (4.11), I have:
ξt = βVut+1 − σβ
P∞
τ=0 aτVut+1+τ = a[Vut+1 − σβ
P∞
τ=0 aτVut+2+τ]
= a[Vut+1 − (βVut+2 − ξt+1)] = a(ξt+1 + ESt+1)
= a
n
ξt+1 + e−Bt+1(kt+1) [PV(kt+1,s) − ξt+1]
o
.
The ﬁrst equality follows from setting Jvt =0f o ra l lt in (4.11), the second equality from re-
grouping terms, the third equality from using the deﬁnition of ξt+1, the fourth equality from (4.5)
and (4.8) which imply Vut+1 − βVut+2 = ESt+1, and the last equality from substituting (4.9) for
ESt+1. Thus, the sequence {ξt}t≥0 obeys (3.10). QED
30Figure 1 Eﬃcient assignment and tightness
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